



The Uncertain Rights of the Unknown Child: Federal 
Uniformity to Social Security Survivors Benefits for the 
Posthumously Conceived Child After Astrue v. Capato 
I. Introduction 
In today’s economy, possibly more than ever, the modern family is faced 
with the worry and need for financial security. That necessity is only 
intensified when a family starts to expand with the addition of children. In 
2010, the United States Department of Agriculture calculated that the total 
expenditures spent raising a child from birth to age seventeen was 
$226,920.1 This represents a 22% increase from 1960, with children’s 
health care expenses doubling as compared to other costs during the same 
time period.2 Given the large costs associated with raising a child, it is 
understandable that parents and potential parents look to utilize all available 
means of income. 
For some unfortunate families, the economic hardship of raising a child 
may be exacerbated by the death of one parent. Such a situation often 
leaves the surviving parent as the sole financial provider for the child. Some 
surviving parents, however, may find a potential source of income from the 
federal government through the Social Security Act (the Act).3 The Act 
provides financial relief to qualified workers and their family members if 
they meet certain requirements. While there are many benefits for which a 
family member may qualify based on his or her relationship to a qualified 
worker,4 this note specifically addresses the relationship status of a 
                                                                                                                 
 1. MARK LINO, CNPP, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., EXPENDITURES ON CHILDREN BY 
FAMILIES, 2010, at 20-21 (Miscellaneous Pub. No. 1528-2010, 2011), available at http:// 
www.cnpp.usda.gov/Publications/CRC/crc2010.pdf (calculating the “total family expenses 
on a child through age 17 . . . for households . . . in the middle [income group]” and 
adjusting costs to 2010 dollar values). 
 2. Id. at 23. 
 3. Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see also SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SURVIVORS BENEFITS 4 (SSA 
Pub. No. 05-10084, 2012), available at http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10084.pdf (“The loss of the 
family wage earner can be devastating . . . . Social Security helps by providing income for 
the families of workers who die . . . . 98 of every 100 children could get benefits if a working 
parent dies. And Social Security pays more benefits to children than any other federal 
program.”). 
 4. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402-416 (2012). 
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posthumously conceived child to a predeceased worker-parent and the right 
of such a child to claim social security child’s insurance benefits.5 
The posthumously conceived child’s right to child’s insurance under the 
Act has been a contentious issue in recent years. As a result, the circuit 
courts were continually called upon to answer the question of insurance 
availability.6 The answers, however, failed to be consistent. More 
specifically, the circuit courts split on the child status question, reaching 
opposite conclusions on who qualified as a “child” under the provisions of 
the Act.7 
As a result of the circuit courts’ failure to reach consensus, the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari in Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C. to resolve the 
issue.8 The Court, based on the language of the Act and the proper standard 
of review, correctly held that a posthumously conceived child does not 
automatically qualify for child’s insurance benefits.9 Instead, his or her 
“child” status must be determined based on applicable state intestacy 
statutes.10 To hold otherwise would have contradicted the purpose and plain 
reading of the Act. As a result, the posthumously conceived child’s right to 
claim child’s insurance benefits under the Act rests solely on that child’s 
ability to claim from his or her predeceased parent’s estate through state 
intestacy law.11 
Understanding this position to be correct requires knowledge of the 
history of the issue, which will permit fuller comparison and a more 
thorough analysis of the ultimate “child” status question. Part II of this note 
provides that history, discussing the standard used by courts to evaluate an 
agency’s interpretation of a federal statute. The section also reveals the 
competing views that different jurisdictions took prior to Capato when 
considering the question of status for posthumously conceived and born 
                                                                                                                 
 5. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(d). 
 6. See, e.g., Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 
2689 (2012); Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2680 
(2012); Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626 (3d Cir. 2011), rev’d 
sub nom. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012); Gillett-Netting v. 
Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004), abrogated by Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021. 
 7. Compare Beeler, 651 F.3d at 964-66 (holding that a posthumously conceived child 
is not a qualified child under the Act), and Schafer, 641 F.3d at 60-61 (same), with Capato, 
631 F.3d at 632 (holding that a posthumously conceived child is a qualified child under the 
Act), and Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 596-97 (same). 
 8. 132 S. Ct. 576 (2011) (granting petition for writ of certiorari). 
 9. Capato, 132 S. Ct at 2033-34. 
 10. Id. at 2034. 
 11. Id. at 2032-34. 
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children. This framework sheds light on Part III’s analysis of the Capato 
decision itself. Part IV assesses the present state of the law and considers 
how states like Oklahoma, a state with unclear intestacy laws regarding 
posthumously conceived children, may fit within the Capato paradigm. 
Given precedent from other jurisdictions, rights of the posthumously 
conceived child may or may not be protected under extant Oklahoma 
legislation and case law. 
II. The Law Before Capato 
A. The Social Security Act 
The Act is “[t]he principal law governing the awarding of social security 
benefits.”12 It provides individuals with financial support at a time when it 
is needed most. The Act is more than a welfare program. Rather, “the 
general purpose . . . of the [applicable] provisions of the statute is to protect 
workers and their dependents from the risk of loss of income due to the 
insured’s old age, death, or disability.”13 The creators of the Act understood 
that “[a]ll peoples throughout . . . history have faced the uncertainties 
brought on by unemployment, illness, disability, death and old age.”14 In an 
attempt to mitigate the harm such events cause, the Act was signed into law 
in 1935.15 Upon signing the Act, President Franklin D. Roosevelt stated: 
 We can never insure one hundred percent of the population 
against one hundred percent of the hazards and vicissitudes of 
life, but we have tried to frame a law which will give some 
measure of protection to the average citizen and to his family 
against the loss of a job and against poverty-ridden old age.16 
The Act is designed to provide workers with future retirement benefits 
drawn from a joint fund that workers contribute to over the course of their 
careers.17 As payback for their work-life contributions, workers and their 
families are later entitled to the benefits created by the Act.18 In other 
words:  
                                                                                                                 
 12. 1 SOCIAL SECURITY LAW & PRACTICE § 1:1 (2013). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Historical Background and Development of Social Security, U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
http://www.ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html (last modified Jan. 10, 2013). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Presidential Statement upon Signing the Social Security Act, 4 PUB. PAPERS 324 
(Aug. 14, 1935). 
 17. See SOCIAL SECURITY LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 12, § 1:1. 
 18. See id. 
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 The “right” to social security benefits [by a worker or family 
member] is in a sense “earned,” for the entire scheme rests on 
the legislative judgment that those who in their productive years 
were functioning members of the economy may justly call upon 
that economy, in their later years, for protection from the rigors 
of poverty.19 
The right to benefits is solely statutory.20 Thus, “the law governing 
eligibility . . . is found exclusively in: (1) the Act; (2) the regulations 
promulgated by the SSA [Social Security Administration]; and (3) 
interpretations of the statute and regulations made by the SSA and federal 
and state courts.”21 
Because the Act provides benefits to a worker’s family members, an 
initial, but not always simple, question must first be answered. Who is 
considered a family member? In the context of survivors child’s insurance 
there are primarily three sections that interplay to determine who can 
qualify for survivors child’s insurance: §§ 402(d), 416(e), and 416(h). 
Section 402(d) is the guiding regulation on awarding child’s insurance 
benefits.22 It provides that “[e]very child (as defined in section 416(e) of 
[title 42]) . . . of an individual who dies a fully or currently insured 
individual” is entitled to insurance benefits if that child meets all of the 
listed requirements.23 Section 402(d) specifically cross-references § 416(e) 
as providing the definition of “child.”24 Consequently, in order to obtain 
“child” status, the child must meet the definition provided in § 416(e). 
Section 416 provides for additional definitions that apply to insurance 
programs.25 As such, § 416(e) provides the definition of a “child,” and in 
doing so lists a number of qualifying means: 
The term “child” means (1) the child or legally adopted child of 
an individual, (2) a stepchild who has been such stepchild for not 
less than one year immediately preceding the day on which 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. § 1:3. 
 21. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 22. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (2012). 
 23. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1) (emphasis added) (specifying that requirements include that 
the “child (A) has filed application for child’s insurance benefits, (B) at the time such 
application was filed was unmarried and (i) either had not attained the age of 18 or was a 
full-time elementary or secondary school student and had not attained the age of 19 . . . , and 
(C) was dependent upon such individual,” among other requirements). 
 24. Id. 
 25. See id. § 416. 
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application for child’s insurance benefits is filed or (if the 
insured individual is deceased) not less than nine months 
immediately preceding the day on which such individual died, 
and (3) a person who is the grandchild or stepgrandchild of an 
individual or his spouse . . . .26 
The agency’s general regulation regarding criteria to qualify as a “child” 
under § 416(e) is 20 C.F.R. § 404.354.27 This section provides that an 
applicant “may be related to the insured person in one of several ways and 
be entitled to benefits as his or her child, i.e., as a natural child, legally 
adopted child, stepchild, grandchild, stepgrandchild, or equitably adopted 
child.”28 
Beyond the list in § 416(e) of qualifying relations, § 416(h) is an 
additional definition section.29 Section 416(h) assists in determining family 
status: 
[T]he Commissioner of Social Security shall apply such [state] 
law as would be applied in determining the devolution of 
intestate personal property by the courts of the State in which 
such insured individual is domiciled . . . or, if such insured 
individual is dead, by the courts of the State in which he was 
domiciled at the time of his death . . . . Applicants who according 
to such law would have the same status relative to taking 
intestate personal property as a child or parent shall be deemed 
such.30 
In addition, § 416(h) indicates that its relevant terms apply to the entire 
subchapter.31 
The broad language of the Act, with various chapters, subchapters, and 
sections, lends itself to several possible interpretations as to who qualifies 
for “child” status. As a result, courts have been called on for guidance and 
resolution. The circuits, however, failed to find consensus, primarily 
reaching two different results. One result was that the Act’s language is 
clear that biologically related, posthumously conceived children meet the 
                                                                                                                 
 26. Id. § 416(e). 
 27. Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2689 
(2012). 
 28. 20 C.F.R. § 404.354 (2012) (further referencing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.355-.359 for 
determining the relationship of an applicant to an insured person). 
 29. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(h). 
 30. Id. § 416(h)(2)(A). 
 31. See id. 
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initial definition in § 416(e) and therefore qualify for “child” status despite 
objections from the Social Security Agency.32 The other result, however, 
was that the Act’s language is unclear.33 As such, the Social Security 
Agency’s interpretation of the Act, which requires application of state 
intestacy laws to determine “child” status, was entitled to Chevron 
deference and was controlling.34 
B. The Chevron Deference Standard of Review 
Interpreting the Act requires courts to review an administrative agency’s 
implementation of a federal statute. In Chevron, the Supreme Court 
established the standard for courts to use in evaluating how an 
administrative agency interprets and implements a statute for which it is 
responsible.35 The Court held that when a court evaluates an agency’s 
construction of a statute it must first determine if Congress has directly 
addressed the issue in question.36 If so, Congress’s intent controls.37 On the 
other hand, if Congress has not directly addressed the issue, the reviewing 
court’s only question is whether the agency’s interpretation of the statute 
“is based on a permissible construction.”38 The Court continued, stating 
“that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department’s 
construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the 
principle of deference to administrative interpretations.”39 The Court 
concluded: 
 When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory 
provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of 
the agency’s policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice 
within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In 
such a case, federal judges—who have no constituency—have a 
                                                                                                                 
 32. See Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 631 (3d Cir. 
2011), rev’d sub nom. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012); Gillett-
Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 597 (9th Cir. 2004), abrogated by Capato, 132 S. Ct. 
2021. 
 33. See Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 959 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 
2689 (2012); Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 54, 63 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 
2680 (2012). 
 34. Beeler, 651 F.3d at 962; Schafer, 641 F.3d at 54, 61. 
 35. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 
(1984). 
 36. Id. at 842. 
 37. Id. at 842-43. 
 38. Id. at 843. 
 39. Id. at 844 (footnote omitted). 
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duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do. 
The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy 
choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of 
the public interest are not judicial ones: “Our Constitution vests 
such responsibilities in the political branches.”40 
With this guidance, the courts have set out to determine who qualifies as a 
“child” under the Act. 
C. The Court Decisions 
The unfortunate circumstances that give rise to this status question 
generally follow similar fact patterns.41 A husband and wife, who plan to 
start a family in the future, receive the devastating diagnosis that the 
husband has cancer.42 In order to treat his condition, the husband must 
undergo chemotherapy.43 After learning that chemotherapy often causes 
male sterility, the husband arranges to bank his sperm for future use.44 
Ultimately, the husband loses his battle with cancer.45 Following his death, 
the wife uses reproductive technology and the husband’s banked sperm to 
conceive a child.46 Once the child is born, the wife applies for child’s 
insurance benefits on behalf of the posthumously conceived child in 
relation to the predeceased father.47 The Social Security Agency, in turn, 
looks to the child’s status under applicable state intestacy laws to determine 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Id. at 866 (quoting Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978)). 
 41. See, e.g., Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 
2689 (2012); Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2680 
(2012); Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626 (3d Cir. 2011), rev’d 
sub nom. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012); Gillett-Netting v. 
Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004), abrogated by Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021. 
 42. See, e.g., Beeler, 651 F.3d at 956; Schafer, 641 F.3d at 51; Capato, 631 F.3d at 627; 
Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 594. 
 43. See, e.g., Beeler, 651 F.3d at 956; Schafer, 641 F.3d at 51; Capato, 631 F.3d at 627; 
Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 594. 
 44. See, e.g., Beeler, 651 F.3d at 956; Schafer, 641 F.3d at 51; Capato, 631 F.3d at 627; 
Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 594. 
 45. See, e.g., Beeler, 651 F.3d at 957; Capato, 631 F.3d at 627; Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d 
at 594. The husband in Schafer died due to a heart attack, rather than as a direct result of 
cancer. Schafer, 641 F.3d at 51. 
 46. See, e.g., Beeler, 651 F.3d at 957; Schafer, 641 F.3d at 51; Capato, 631 F.3d at 628; 
Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 595. 
 47. See, e.g., Beeler, 651 F.3d at 957; Schafer, 641 F.3d at 51; Capato, 631 F.3d at 628; 
Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 595. 
202 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:195 
 
 
status under the Act.48 Faced with similar facts and the same question, the 
federal circuits’ treatment of the issue has varied.49 
1. The Initial Issue of “Child” Status Brought to State Courts 
As the issue of claiming benefits for a posthumously conceived child 
first arose, state courts were called upon to add insight and meaning to state 
intestacy laws. 
a) In re Estate of Kolacy: A Posthumously Conceived Right to Inherit 
Under New Jersey Law 
When the action, which sought a declaratory judgment that 
posthumously conceived children could inherit under state intestacy law, 
was brought before the New Jersey court, there was no court case dealing 
with the issue.50 The court’s analysis began with a look at basic estate law 
principles.51 The court explained that “the identity of people who will take 
property from a decedent has traditionally been determined as of the date of 
the decedent’s death.”52 That determination, however, has been subject to 
“exceptions . . . based on human experience.”53 The court recognized that 
there are times when a man “cause[s] a woman to become pregnant and 
then die[s] before the . . . child is born.”54 This routine human experience—
that sometimes a child is born after the death of the father—has resulted in 
statutory law that “hold[s] the process of identifying takers from a 
decedent’s estate open long enough” for the posthumously born child to 
inherit “from and through [the] father.”55 To answer the more complicated 
issue of whether a child both posthumously conceived and posthumously 
                                                                                                                 
 48. See, e.g., Beeler, 651 F.3d at 966 n.4; Schafer, 641 F.3d at 51; Capato, 631 F.3d at 
628. 
 49. Compare Beeler, 651 F.3d at 966 (holding that “child’s insurance benefits [are 
determined] by reference to state intestacy law”), and Schafer, 641 F.3d at 63 (holding that 
determining child’s insurance eligibility by reference to state intestacy law was at least a 
reasonable interpretation entitled to Chevron deference), with Capato, 631 F.3d at 632 
(holding that an undisputed biological relationship can determine “child” status), and Gillett-
Netting, 371 F.3d at 597 (holding that § 416(h) “do[es] not come into play for the purposes 
of determining whether a claimant is the ‘child’ of a deceased wage earner unless parentage 
is disputed”). 
 50. In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1260 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000). 
 51. See id. at 1260-61. 
 52. Id. at 1260. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 1261. 
 55. Id. 
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born could inherit through and from a deceased father, the court was 
required to look at existing state intestacy and parentage laws.56 
First, the court looked at state intestacy law.57 The court stressed that the 
ideal handling of this issue would take place at the legislative level.58 
However, the court recognized that even without a statutory provision 
directly on point, justice required the court to give present day meaning to 
existing law.59 The court determined that the basic legislative intent was to 
allow a posthumously conceived child to inherit, and that “intent should 
prevail over a restrictive, literal reading of” the statute.60 
In addition, the court considered the state’s parentage act.61 As a whole, 
most of the parentage act’s provisions did not pertain to the present issue.62 
The court held, however, that the sensible reading of the relevant provisions 
and the basic human experience brought to light by reproductive technology 
allowed for these particular children, in this case, to inherit under state 
intestacy.63 
                                                                                                                 
 56. Id. at 1261-63. 
 57. See id. at 1260. 
 58. Id. at 1261. 
 59. Id. at 1261-62. 
 60. Id. at 1262. The court recognized that “[i]t would undoubtedly be both fair and 
constitutional for a Legislature” or court to put limits on the amount of time that could pass 
between a father’s death and the posthumously conceived child’s birth in certain 
circumstances. Id. However, it also recognized that the children’s right to inherit in this case 
did not present any administrative complications for the decedent’s estate and, therefore, no 
time limit was required. Id. 
 61. See id. at 1262-63. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 1262-64. The court looked at two relevant provisions in the state’s parentage 
act. See id. at 1262-63. The first provision provided that “[a] man is presumed to be the 
biological father of a child if: He and the child’s biological mother are or have been married 
to each other and the child is born during the marriage, or within 300 days after the marriage 
is terminated by death, annulment or divorce.” Id. at 1262 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-
43a(1) (West 1998)). While a plain reading of this provision would suggest that a child born 
more than 300 days after a man’s death would not be considered his “child,” the court 
determined that to find as such would create a presumption against parentage and that “such 
a . . . presumption of non-parentage would be somewhat strained because it is 
counterproductive to the purposes of the act.” Id. at 1263. The second provision provided, in 
part, that: 
 a. If under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of 
her husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by a man not 
her husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were the natural father of a 
child thereby conceived. The husband’s consent shall be in writing and signed 
by him and his wife . . . . 
204 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:195 
 
 
b) Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security: A Federal Court 
Requests a “First Impression” Answer from a State Court 
The first time a federal court was called upon to answer the question of a 
posthumously conceived child’s inheritance rights with respect to the Act 
was in Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security.64 To resolve the 
issue, the District of Massachusetts sent a certified question to the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, asking whether children 
posthumously conceived using medical technology “enjoy[ed] the [same] 
inheritance rights of natural children under Massachusetts’ law of intestate 
succession.”65 
The state court began its analysis by turning to the state’s intestacy 
laws.66 The statute regarding posthumous children provided that they 
“‘shall be considered as living at the death of their parent.’”67 The court 
noted, however, that the legislature had left both the modifier “posthumous” 
undefined and the provision unchanged for 165 years.68 The court 
recognized that assisted reproductive technology, which made posthumous 
conception possible, had been available and widely known for decades, 
during which time the legislature failed to take any steps to narrow the 
scope of the state intestacy laws.69 The court determined that “the 
Legislature’s overriding purpose [was] to promote the welfare of all 
children,” and that while “[p]osthumously conceived children may not 
come into the world the way the majority of children do[] . . . they are 
children nonetheless.”70 The court then sought to balance the interests of 
posthumously conceived children with three important state interests: (1) 
                                                                                                                 
 b. Unless the donor of semen and the woman have entered into a written 
contract to the contrary, the donor of semen provided to a licensed physician 
for use in the artificial insemination of a woman other than the donor’s wife is 
treated in law as if he were not the father of a child thereby conceived and shall 
have no rights or duties stemming from the conception of a child. 
Id. at 1263 (alteration in original) (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. 9:17-44). The court accepted the 
mother’s statement that the decedent-father expressly authorized the use of his sperm for 
conception after his death. Id. Based on these considerations, the court found that a 
posthumously conceived child could inherit from the predeceased father under state 
intestacy law. Id. at 1263-64. 
 64. See 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002). 
 65. Id. at 259. 
 66. See id. at 262-70. 
 67. Id. at 264 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190, § 8 (repealed 2008)). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 265. 
 70. Id. at 266. 
2013]       NOTE 205 
 
 
protecting the rights “of children who are alive or conceived before the 
intestate parent’s death,” (2) “provid[ing] certainty to heirs and creditors,” 
and (3) “honor[ing] the reproductive choices of individuals.”71 Ultimately, 
the court decided that a posthumously conceived child could inherit through 
intestate succession if there was a biological connection between the child 
and the deceased parent, and the deceased parent “affirmatively consented 
to posthumous conception and to the support of any resulting child.”72 
However, time restrictions could ultimately preclude inheritance.73 
By recognizing the potential right of a posthumously conceived child to 
inherit through intestate succession, the court laid the foundation for such 
children to claim benefits under the Act. The actual receipt of benefits, 
however, has failed to be automatic or uniform. 
2. Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart: A Genetically Related Child Automatically 
Qualifies for Benefits 
In Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, the Ninth Circuit became the first federal 
appeals court to address the status of posthumously conceived children 
under the Act.74 The court first looked at the language of the Act and found 
that it “define[d] ‘child’ broadly to include any ‘child or legally adopted 
child of an individual.’”75 The court recognized that § 416(h) provided the 
means for qualifying as a “child” under the Act by determining if that child 
would inherit from the parent through state intestacy.76 The court, however, 
found that § 416(h) only came into play when parentage was in dispute, and 
that “nothing in the statute suggests that a child must prove parentage under 
§ 416(h) if it is not disputed.”77 Therefore, the court determined that 
because biological parentage was not disputed, § 416(h) of the Act was 
inapplicable, and the posthumously conceived child qualified as a “child” 
of the father for purposes of the Act.78 Therefore, the child was entitled to 
survivors benefits.79 Because the court found the Act’s language clearly 
provided for biologically related children to claim benefits, it did not 
address the issue of applying Chevron deference to the SSA’s 
                                                                                                                 
 71. Id. at 266, 268. 
 72. Id. at 272. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004), abrogated by Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 
S. Ct. 2021 (2012). 
 75. Id. at 596 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 416(e) (2000)). 
 76. Id. at 597. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 599. 
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interpretation. The court’s analysis provided the federal circuits with an 
initial framework for future cases. Seven years later, the issue was again 
raised in federal court with three cases in three different circuits—the Third, 
Fourth, and Eighth.80 
3. The Third Circuit’s Treatment of Capato: Agreement That Biological 
Parentage Qualifies a Child for Benefits 
In Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Commissioner of Social Security, the Third 
Circuit followed an analytical mode similar to that used by the Ninth 
Circuit in Gillett-Netting.81 The court determined that “[t]he plain language 
of §§ 402(d) and 416(e) provides a threshold basis for defining benefit 
eligibility.”82 Section 416(h) was to be used to determine eligibility only 
where an applicant’s relation to a deceased wage earner was in doubt: 
“Were it the case that such status had to be determined here, we would turn 
to the relevant provisions of § 416(h).”83 The court held that because the 
children in this case were the undisputed biological children of the husband, 
they automatically qualified as “children” within the meaning of the Act.84 
The Third Circuit’s agreement with the Ninth Circuit appeared to solidify 
the Act’s status issue regarding posthumously conceived children. 
However, other circuits disagreed. 
4. Schafer v. Astrue: Where the Split Began 
The Ninth and Third Circuits found the plain language of the Act to be 
clear, which required no evaluation of the SSA’s interpretation.85 As the 
status issue continued to make its way to the federal circuit level, however, 
other circuits did not find the meaning so clear. As a result, circuits began 
to apply the Chevron deference standard of review.86 Once the SSA’s 
interpretation of the Act was given deference, the only way to qualify for 
“child” status was through state intestacy laws as required by § 416(h).87 
                                                                                                                 
 80. See Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2689 
(2012); Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2680 (2012); 
Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626 (3d Cir. 2011), rev’d sub nom. 
Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012). 
 81. Compare Capato, 631 F.3d at 628-32, with Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 595-99. 
 82. Capato, 631 F.3d at 631. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See id. at 632. 
 85. See Schafer, 641 F.3d at 55. 
 86. See Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 959-62 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 
2689 (2012); Schafer, 641 F.3d at 54-62. 
 87. See Beeler, 651 F.3d at 966; Schafer, 641 F.3d at 62-63. 
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In Shafer v. Astrue, the Fourth Circuit took up the question previously 
considered by the Ninth and Third Circuits.88 Like the previous circuit 
decisions, this court centered its focus on whether the posthumously 
conceived child met the statutory requirements of the Act by looking at the 
language of the Act itself.89 The court noted, however, that under the 
principles established by the Supreme Court in Chevron,90 an agency’s 
interpretation may not be overruled unless it is “‘arbitrary or capricious in 
substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.’”91 The court determined 
that the SSA’s interpretation of the Act, which requires a “child” to be 
eligible to inherit through state intestacy, pursuant to § 416(h), was 
reasonable and entitled to deference.92 As a result, the court affirmed the 
district court’s denial of benefits.93 
5. Beeler v. Astrue: Agreeing to Apply Chevron Deference to the Act’s 
Interpretation 
Shortly after Schafer, the Eighth Circuit faced the same question.94 The 
court maintained that the SSA’s denial of benefits to a posthumously 
conceived child, who could not inherit under applicable state intestacy, 
“was supported by reasonable construction of the governing statutes and 
regulations.”95 Thus, the court reversed the decision of the lower court and 
remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the SSA.96 
The court followed the Fourth Circuit’s line of reasoning, focusing first 
on the interplay of the appropriate provisions of the Act, namely the 
similarities, references, and differences between §§ 402(d), 416(e), and 
416(h).97 The Eighth Circuit ultimately concluded, however, that this was 
“a question of statutory interpretation” left to the SSA.98 The court 
recognized that “[w]hen Congress has delegated authority to an 
administrative agency to interpret and implement a federal statute, we give 
                                                                                                                 
 88. See 641 F.3d 49. 
 89. See id. at 51-52. 
 90. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 91. Schafer, 641 F.3d at 61 (quoting Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United 
States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 711 (2011)). 
 92. Id. at 62-63. 
 93. Id. at 63. 
 94. See Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 959 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 
2689 (2012). 
 95. Id. at 966. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See id. at 957-59. 
 98. Id. at 959. 
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the agency’s interpretation deference pursuant to Chevron.”99 Indeed, “the 
agency’s ‘view governs if it is a reasonable interpretation,’” regardless of 
whether there are other possible interpretations and even if it is not the most 
reasonable.100 The court determined that the agency’s interpretation of the 
Act represented authoritative construction and was entitled to Chevron 
deference.101 Thus, in the Eighth Circuit, the agency’s interpretation 
governed.102 
III. The Supreme Court Brings Federal Consistency to the Issue in Astrue v. 
Capato ex rel. B.N.C. 
A. Facts of the Case 
In May 1999, the Capatos—Robert and Karen—were married.103 Soon 
after their wedding, Mr. Capato was diagnosed with esophageal cancer.104 
He was told that the chemotherapy required to treat his cancer might leave 
him sterile.105 Because the couple wanted to have children, Mr. Capato 
placed his semen in a sperm bank for storage prior to beginning his 
chemotherapy.106 Despite the fact that Mr. Capato was undergoing intense 
treatment, Mrs. Capato conceived naturally, giving birth to their son.107 But 
the couple still wanted another child.108 
Unfortunately, Mr. Capato’s health continued to deteriorate, and he died 
in March 2002 in Florida, where he resided with Mrs. Capato.109 Mr. 
Capato’s will, which was executed in Florida, named his three children as 
beneficiaries.110 There were no provisions in the will that provided for any 
future children; however, the Capatos had previously indicated to their 
lawyer that they wanted all future children to receive the same benefits as 
Mr. Capato’s then-existing children.111 After Mr. Capato’s death, Mrs. 
                                                                                                                 
 99. Id. (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984)). 
 100. Id. (quoting Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 218 (2009)). 
 101. Id. at 962. 
 102. See id. at 961-62. 
 103. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2026 (2012). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
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Capato underwent in vitro fertilization using her deceased husband’s stored 
sperm.112 She conceived and ultimately gave birth to twins eighteen months 
after Mr. Capato’s death.113 
B. Procedural History 
Following the birth of her children, Mrs. Capato filed a claim on behalf 
of the children for survivor child’s insurance benefits.114 The SSA denied 
her claim, contending that the twins could only qualify for benefits if they 
could inherit from their deceased father under applicable state intestacy 
laws.115 The SSA’s decision was affirmed by the federal district court, 
which found that Mr. Capato had died while domiciled in Florida and, 
under that state’s intestacy law, a posthumously born child could only 
inherit if he or she was conceived prior to the decedent’s death.116 
Mrs. Capato appealed the decision to the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals.117 The circuit court reversed the decision of district court and held 
that, “[u]nder § 416(e), . . . ‘the undisputed biological children of a 
deceased wage earner . . .’ qualify for survivors benefits without regard to 
state intestacy law.”118 
C. Decision of the Court 
In beginning its analysis, the Court recognized that the circuit courts 
were divided on the statutory interpretation issue presented by the case.119 
The Court looked first at the Act itself, stating that “Congress amended the 
Social Security Act in 1939 to provide a monthly benefit for designated 
surviving family members of a deceased insured wage earner. ‘Child’s 
insurance benefits’ are among the Act’s family-protective measures.”120 
The Court then looked to the particular sections of the Act, namely §§ 
402(d), 416(e), and 416(h), to determine who qualifies as a “child” under 
the Act, and how.121 
                                                                                                                 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See id. at 2027. 
 118. Id. (quoting Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 631 (3d 
Cir. 2011)). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (2012)). 
 121. See id. at 2027-28. 
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The Court focused first on § 402(d), which provides that a child meets 
the definition of “child” if he or she is (1) unmarried, (2) “below [the 
statute’s] specified age limits (18 or 19) or is under a disability which began 
prior to age 22”, and (3) “was dependent on the insured at the time of the 
insured’s death.”122 The Court turned next to § 416(e) and pointed out that 
“[t]he word ‘child’ . . . appears twice in § 416(e)’s opening sentence: 
initially in the prefatory phrase . . . and, immediately thereafter, in 
subsection (e)(1) (‘child or legally adopted child’).”123 The Court noted, 
however, that the word “child” in § 416(e) “is a definition of scant utility 
without aid from neighboring provisions.”124 Rather, the useful definition is 
provided by § 416(h).125 Turning to those definitional provisions, the Court 
found that “[u]nder the heading ‘Determination of family status,’ § 
416(h)(2)(A) provides: ‘In determining whether an applicant is the child or 
parent of [an] insured individual for purposes of this subchapter, the 
Commissioner of Social Security shall apply [the intestacy law of the 
insured individual’s domiciliary State].’”126 
The Court then found that the SSA had interpreted these provisions of 
the Act through notice-and-comment rulemaking.127 The SSA determined: 
[A]n applicant may qualify for insurance benefits as a “natural 
child” by meeting any of four conditions: (1) the applicant 
                                                                                                                 
 122. Id. at 2027 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)). 
 123. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 416(e)). 
 124. Id. at 2033. 
 125. See id. 
 126. Id. at 2028 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 
416(h)(2)(A)). The Court also noted that: 
An applicant for child benefits who does not meet § 416(h)(2)(A)’s intestacy-
law criterion may nonetheless qualify for benefits under one of several other 
criteria the Act prescribes. First, an applicant who “is a son or daughter” of an 
insured individual, but is not determined to be a “child” under the intestacy-law 
provision, nevertheless ranks as a “child” if the insured and the other parent 
went through a marriage ceremony that would have been valid but for certain 
legal impediments. § 416(h)(2)(B). Further, an applicant is deemed a “child” if, 
before death, the insured acknowledged in writing that the applicant is his or 
her son or daughter, or if the insured had been decreed by a court to be the 
father or mother of the applicant, or had been ordered to pay child support. § 
416(h)(3)(C)(i). In addition, an applicant may gain “child” status upon proof 
that the insured individual was the applicant’s parent and “was living with or 
contributing to the support of the applicant” when the insured individual died. § 
416(h)(3)(C)(ii). 
Id. 
 127. Id. 
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“could inherit the insured’s personal property as his or her 
natural child under State inheritance laws”; (2) the applicant is 
“the insured’s natural child and [his or her parents] went through 
a ceremony which would have resulted in a valid marriage 
between them except for a legal impediment”; (3) before death, 
the insured acknowledged in writing his or her parentage of the 
applicant, was decreed by a court to be the applicant’s parent, or 
was ordered by a court to contribute to the applicant’s support; 
or (4) other evidence shows that the insured is the applicant’s 
“natural father or mother” and was either living with, or 
contributing to the support of, the applicant.128 
As such, the SSA interpreted the Act to mean that “42 U.S.C. § 416(h) 
governs the meaning of ‘child’ in § 416(e)(1). In other words, § 416(h) is a 
gateway through which all applicants for insurance benefits as a ‘child’ 
must pass.”129 In finding such, the SSA believed § 416(h)(2)(A) to provide 
the definitional cue for its application of § 416(e) by providing “in [its] 
opening instruction: ‘In determining whether an applicant is the child . . . of 
[an] insured individual for purposes of this subchapter,’ the Commissioner 
shall apply state intestacy law.”130 The subchapter that § 416(h) applies “is 
Subchapter II of the Act, which spans §§ 401 through 434.”131 The Court 
concluded that Congress, “[h]aving explicitly complemented § 416(e) by 
the definitional provisions contained in § 416(h) . . . had no need to place a 
redundant cross-reference in § 416(e).”132 
Following the recitation of the SSA’s interpretation of the Act, the Court 
had to determine what, if any, credence it should give to the interpretation. 
The Court held that “Chevron deference is appropriate ‘when it appears that 
Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying 
the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was 
promulgated in the exercise of that authority.’”133 The Court determined 
that “the SSA’s longstanding interpretation is set forth in [published] 
regulations,”134 that the regulations are consistent with authority given to 
the Commissioner by Congress, and that the “regulations are neither 
                                                                                                                 
 128. Id. at 2028-29 (second alteration in original) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.355(a)). 
 129. Id. at 2029. 
 130. Id. at 2030-31 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 
416(h)(2)(A)). 
 131. Id. at 2031. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 2033-34 (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001)). 
 134. Id. at 2034. 
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‘arbitrary or capricious in substance, [n]or manifestly contrary to 
statute.’”135 As a result, the Court applied Chevron deference and held that 
“the law Congress enacted calls for resolution of [this case] . . . by 
reference to state intestacy law.”136 The Third Circuit’s previous ruling was, 
consequently, reversed.137 
IV. Analysis 
The Court’s decision finally brings consistency to the courts regarding 
posthumously conceived children and their right to claim survivor’s 
benefits under the Act. 
A. The Court’s Decision 
In Capato, the Court brought an end to the circuit split that had resulted 
from the Third, Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits’ holdings. The Third and 
Ninth Circuits had previously focused primarily on the biological 
relationship between the predeceased father and the child.138 Those circuits 
determined that when the genetic relation of the child to the deceased parent 
was not disputed, the child automatically qualified as a “child” under § 
416(e).139 
The reasoning used by the Third and Ninth Circuits was rejected by the 
Supreme Court, which followed the same method of analysis as the Fourth 
and Eighth Circuits.140 The Court determined that the SSA’s interpretation 
of the Act satisfied the Chevron deference standard.141 Under Chevron 
deference, an administrative agency’s view regarding a statute “‘governs if 
it is a reasonable interpretation of the statute—not necessarily the only 
possible interpretation, nor even the interpretation deemed most 
                                                                                                                 
 135. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. 
United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 711 (2011)). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 631-32 (3d Cir. 
2011), rev’d sub nom. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021; Gillett-Netting v. 
Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 596-98 (9th Cir. 2004), abrogated by Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021. 
 139. See Capato, 631 F.3d at 632 (holding that biological relationship determines “child” 
status); Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 596 (recognizing that the courts and the SSA have 
interpreted “child” to include “the natural, or biological, child of the insured”). 
 140. Compare Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2033-34, with Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 960-
66 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2689 (2012), and Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 
54-62 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2680 (2012). 
 141. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2033-34. 
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reasonable.’”142 The courts determined that the SSA’s interpretation of the 
Act, while not the only possible interpretation, was reasonable and entitled 
to deference.143 
As such, the Supreme Court properly determined that the interpretation 
of the Act, and the one provided by the SSA, required application of all 
sections, namely §§ 402(d), 416(e), and 416(h).144 The SSA’s interpretation 
holds that the only way to qualify as a “child” is to meet the criteria 
established in § 416(h).145 While § 416(e) allows for a “natural child” to 
qualify for benefits, the SSA contends that the only way to qualify as a 
“natural child” under § 416(e) is to meet one of the criteria set out in § 
416(h) (that is, to qualify as a “natural child,” a child must be able to inherit 
through state intestacy laws).146 This reasoning is based on the stated 
application of § 416(h), which provides “that the Commissioner ‘shall’ use 
state intestacy law in determining whether an applicant is the ‘child’ of an 
insured individual ‘for purposes of this subchapter.’”147 Sections 416(e) and 
416(h) are part of the same subchapter.148 Therefore, all sections of the 
subchapter must meet the criteria of § 416(h), including § 416(e). 
The SSA’s interpretation also correlates with the legislative history of 
the Act and the evolution of applicable sections. As the Court recognized, 
Congress established child’s insurance benefits under the Act in 1939.149 
Under its original language, “§ 209(m)—the forerunner of the current 42 
U.S.C. § 416(h)—provid[ed] that ‘[i]n determining whether an applicant is 
the wife, widow, [or] child . . . the [Social Security] Board shall apply such 
law as would be applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal 
property.’”150 In 1965, when Congress codified the current language, “the 
                                                                                                                 
 142. Beeler, 651 F.3d at 959 (quoting Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 
218 (2009)); see also Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2033-34 (reiterating that Chevron deference is 
appropriate when an administrative agency’s interpretation is neither arbitrary nor capricious 
in substance). 
 143. See Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2026, 2033-34; Beeler, 651 F.3d at 956, 959; Schafer, 641 
F.3d at 51. 
 144. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2027-28, 2030-31. 
 145. See id. at 2026; Beeler, 651 F.3d at 960. 
 146. Beeler, 651 F.3d at 962, 964. 
 147. Id. at 963 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (2006)). 
 148. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2031 (noting that the applicable subchapter includes 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 401-34). 
 149. Id. at 2027. 
 150. Beeler, 651 F.3d at 964 (second and fifth alterations in original) (quoting Social 
Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, § 209(m), 53 Stat. 1360, 1378 (1939) (current 
version at 42 U.S.C. § 416(h))). 
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relevant committee report explained that . . . ‘[u]nder present law, whether 
a child meets the definition of a child . . . depends on the laws applied in 
determining the devolution of interstate [sic] personal property.’”151 The 
committee found the existing law’s effects on illegitimate children too 
harsh because most illegitimate children were unable to qualify for intestate 
inheritance.152 In an effort to remedy such a result, the language now found 
in § 416(h)(3) was added.153 These additional protections, however, do not 
mean that “§ 416(h) applie[s] only to illegitimate children or to children 
whose parentage is disputed.”154 On the contrary, “[t]he preexisting 
statutory framework already established that a natural child must show an 
ability to inherit under state law in order to receive . . . benefits under the 
Act.”155 
By giving the SSA’s interpretation Chevron deference, the Court 
properly disposed of the issue. Under the Chevron deference standard, an 
agency’s interpretation of a statute is controlling if it is reasonable and 
neither arbitrary nor capricious to the statute.156 Therefore, the SSA’s 
interpretation does not have to be the only interpretation, the most logical 
interpretation, or the “best” interpretation; it only has to be a reasonable 
interpretation.157 
Based on the language of the Act and the legislative history, the SSA’s 
interpretation is reasonable. It is reasonable to read the sections of the Act 
that determine the status of a “child” as an inclusive group, rather than an 
exclusive independent group. Additionally, § 416(h) explicitly states that it 
relates to all parts of its subchapter.158 Sections 416(e) and 416(h) are both 
parts of subchapter II.159 Therefore, it is reasonable to apply the definitions 
established by § 416(h) to the “child” status created by § 416(e). The 
reasonableness of the SSA’s interpretation is further supported by the 
legislative history of the Act. When Congress first established child’s 
insurance benefits, it determined a “natural child’s” status by looking at the 
                                                                                                                 
 151. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 89-404, at 109 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1943, 1958). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2034 (2012). 
 157. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 
(2005) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-
44 & n.11 (1984)). 
 158. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) (2012). 
 159. See id. § 416(e), (h).  
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right of the child to inherit through state intestacy statutes.160 When 
Congress later amended the Act, the objective was not to change how a 
“natural child” was determined, but instead to provide additional ways for 
“illegitimate children,” who were largely excluded from state intestacy 
schemes, to gain “child” status for purposes of the Act.161 
With the Court’s decision, the split that plagued the courts is settled. The 
rights under the Act of the unknown, posthumously conceived child, 
however, are still uncertain. The battlefield has shifted to state courts and 
the interpretation of state intestacy statutes. 
B. The Status of a Posthumously Conceived Child in Oklahoma 
Currently, the status question of a posthumously conceived child and his 
or her right to claim child’s insurance under the Act has not been raised in 
Oklahoma. As such, there are two possible outcomes a court could reach if, 
or more likely when, the issue reaches an Oklahoma state court. Oklahoma 
courts could determine either: (1) that current state intestacy laws allow for 
a posthumously conceived child to inherit from a predeceased parent, or (2) 
that they do not so allow. 
Oklahoma intestacy law is unclear regarding the inheritance rights of a 
posthumously conceived child. The laws that govern descent and 
distribution do not address the posthumously born child, let alone a child 
that is posthumously conceived and then born.162 Because posthumously 
conceived children are not specifically mentioned in the statute and 
Oklahoma case law is silent on the issue, the Oklahoma courts could look to 
see what other jurisdictions with similar statutes have done. By doing so, 
the courts may find a solution in the Woodward decision.163 While 
Oklahoma’s descent and distribution laws do not address a posthumously 
born child, Oklahoma law regarding representation and posthumous 
children states that “[p]osthumous children are considered as living at the 
death of their parents.”164 This is essentially the same language included in 
the Massachusetts representation statute that the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court referenced when determining that posthumously conceived 
                                                                                                                 
 160. See Beeler, 651 F.3d at 963-64. 
 161. See id. at 964. 
 162. See 84 OKLA. STAT. § 213(B) (2011). 
 163. See Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002). 
 164. 84 OKLA. STAT. § 228. 
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children could have intestate inheritance rights.165 The Oklahoma statute, 
however, was enacted before the current realities of reproductive 
technology were known.166 As a result, the courts may look at more recent 
Oklahoma legislation to determine the intent of the legislature with regard 
to inheritance rights and the posthumously conceived child. 
Recent Oklahoma legislation suggests that the legislature may have 
intended to provide rights to posthumously conceived children. Oklahoma 
recently adopted aspects of the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA).167 The UPA 
allows for a “mother of a child and a man claiming to be the genetic father 
of the child [to] sign an acknowledgement of paternity with intent to 
establish the man’s paternity.”168 The father’s signed acknowledgment can 
establish the paternal relationship;169 however, the unanswered question 
becomes whether such a signed acknowledgment can be made 
preconception and still establish paternity to a posthumously conceived 
child. Regarding posthumously born children, the Oklahoma legislature 
adopted the provision of the UPA that provides “[a] man is presumed to be 
the father of a child if . . . [h]e and the mother of the child were married to 
each other and the child is born within three hundred (300) days after the 
marriage is terminated by death.”170 This provision recognizes the rights of 
a child conceived and posthumously born, but does not provide guidance 
regarding the posthumously conceived child.171 While it does not discuss a 
posthumously conceived child, a similar provision was not found to bar 
such a child’s right to intestate inheritance by a New Jersey state court.172 
                                                                                                                 
 165. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 264 (“That section provides that ‘[p]osthumous children 
shall be considered as living at the death of their parent.’” (alteration in original) (quoting 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190, § 8 (repealed 2008))). 
 166. The language of the pertinent provision—title 84, section 228 of the Oklahoma 
Statutes—can be traced back to at least the 1890 laws of the Territory of Oklahoma. See 88 
TERR. OKLA. STAT. § 18 (1890) (“Posthumous children are considered as living at the death 
of their parents.”). 
 167. See 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7700-101 to -902 (2011). 
 168. Id. § 7700-301. 
 169. See id. § 7700-301 to -302, -304 to -305. 
 170. Id. § 7700-204(A). 
 171. See id.  
 172. See In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1262 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000) 
(“One provision of the Parentage Act which is facially somewhat relevant to our case is 
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is born during the marriage, or within 300 days after the marriage is terminated by death, 
annulment or divorce.’” (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-43(a) (West 2000))). 
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On the other hand, the parts of the UPA that the Oklahoma legislature 
did not adopt may prove more telling to the legislature’s actual intent. The 
Oklahoma legislature left out the entire article on “Child of Assisted 
Reproduction.”173 Specifically, the legislature did not adopt the provision of 
the act that states: 
 If an individual who consented in a record to be a parent by 
assisted reproduction dies before placement of eggs, sperm, or 
embryos, the deceased individual is not a parent of the resulting 
child unless the deceased spouse [sic] consented in a record that 
if assisted reproduction were to occur after death, the deceased 
individual would be a parent of the child.174 
Adoption of this section would have provided a clear legal avenue for 
establishing posthumously conceived parentage. The failure of the 
Oklahoma legislature to adopt this provision suggests that it did not intend 
to give posthumously conceived children intestacy inheritance rights. 
As such, if a posthumously conceived child, whose father was domiciled 
in Oklahoma at his time of death, applied for survivor benefits under the 
Act, the child’s ability to claim such benefits is still uncertain. The 
determination would be the result of best-effort judicial interpretation of 
presumed legislative intent. 
V. Conclusion 
The Social Security Act was adopted to provide families with some 
economic protection against the hardships caused by old age, 
unemployment, and death. One protection provided is insurance benefits for 
survivors of deceased workers. Survivor insurance is available to the child 
of a deceased worker if the child meets the requirements set out by the Act. 
Sections 402(d), 416(e), and 416(h) all play a role in determining “child” 
status. All of these sections interrelate by reference or cross-reference. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to apply all three sections when determining if a 
“child” fulfills the status requirements. As a result, the SSA’s interpretation 
was reasonable, and the Supreme Court correctly applied Chevron 
deference in Capato. The rights at the federal level are finally clear; the 
uncertainty that still exists, however, is the posthumously conceived child’s 
                                                                                                                 
 173. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) §§ 701-707 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 354-59 
(2001 & Supp. 2013). 
 174. Id. § 707, 9B U.L.A. at 358. 
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status under various states intestacy laws. That is an issue that each state 
must determine itself. 
 
Nathan Rick Allred 
